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Abstract—We present the computational wiretap channel:
Alice has some data x and wants to share some computation
h(x) with Bob. To do this, she sends f(x), where f is some
sufficient statistic for h. An eavesdropper, Eve, is interested in
computing another function g(x). We show that, under some
conditions on f and g, this channel can be approximated, from
Eve’s point of view, by the classic Wyner wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
We present the computational wiretap channel. Alice has
some data x and wants to share some computation h(x)
with Bob. To do this, she sends f(x), where f is some
sufficient statistic for h. An eavesdropper, Eve, is interested in
computing another function g(x). A diagram for this channel
is shown in Figure 1a.
The computational wiretap channel is a natural model for
various settings. For example, Alice could be a user in a social
network sharing articles, pictures or videos she likes with her
friend, Bob, and Eve could be the service provider trying to
classify some of Alice’s personal attributes like her sexual
orientation, ethnicity, political views, etc (See [1]).
Our main result is that, under certain conditions on the
functions f and g, the computational wiretap channel can be
approximated by the classic wiretap channel [5], shown in
Figure 1b. Our result has two versions, one for real-valued
Boolean functions and one for Boolean functions. We state
them here informally.
Theorem 1. (Informal) Let f, g : {−1, 1}n → R be real-
valued Boolean functions. Suppose f and g are low influence
functions, i.e., their values do not rely too much on any
coordinate. Then, from Eve’s point of view, the computational
wiretap, shown in Figure 1a, can be approximated by an
additive wiretap channel, shown in Figure 2a.
Theorem 2. (Informal) Let f, g : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}
be Boolean functions. Suppose f and g are low influence
functions, i.e., their values do not rely too much on any
coordinate. Then, from Eve’s point of view, the computational
wiretap, shown in Figure 1a, can be approximated by a
multiplicative wiretap channel, shown in Figure 2b.
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 rely heavily on a gen-
eralization, known as the Basic Invariance Principle [2], of
the Berry-Esseen theorem. To use this result we will need
some notation and tools from the field of analysis of Boolean
functions, the topic of Section II.
In the remaining sections we consider different classes for
the functions f and g. For each class of functions we show a
formal equivalence between the computational wiretap channel
and the classic wiretap channel in Theorems 6, 7, and 8. These
formal equivalences are used to prove our two main results,
Theorem 1 in Section IV, and Theorem 2 in Section V.
II. ANALYSIS OF BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
In this section we give the necessary tools for proving
Theorems 1 and 2. These theorems rely heavily on what is
known as the Basic Invariance Principle [2], presented in
Theorem 5, a generalization of the Berry-Esseen Theorem.
All results in this section, apart from Lemmas 1, 2, and 3,
are taken from [3] and are included here for the convenience
of the reader.
Analysis of Boolean functions is the study of real-valued
Boolean functions f : {−1, 1}n → R using analytical
techniques. We begin by looking at the Fourier expansion.
Alice Bob
Eve
x f(x) h(x)
ĝ(x)
(a) The Computational Wiretap Channel: Alice sends a computation
f(x) of her data, where f is a sufficient statistic for h. Thus, Bob is
able to retrieve h(x) perfectly and Eve has an estimate ĝ(x) of g(x).
Alice Channel Bob
Eve
u u w û
v
û
(b) The Classic Wiretap Channel: Alice sends a message u ∈ U
through a channel which outputs w ∈ W to Bob and v ∈ V to Eve
with probability Pr(w = w, v = v|u = u). Bob and Eve estimate u.
Fig. 1: Computational vs. classic wiretap channel. Our main result is that, under certain conditions on f and g, the computational
wiretap channel can be approximated, from Eve’s point of view, to a classic wiretap channel.
Alice
⊕
Bob
Eve
u u u+N û
u+N
û
N
(a) The Additive Wiretap Channel: Alice sends a message u ∈ R
through a channel which outputs u + N ∈ R. Both Bob and Eve
output an estimate û of u.
Alice
⊗
Bob
Eve
u u uN û
uN
û
N
(b) The Multiplicative Wiretap Channel: Alice sends a message
u ∈ {−1, 1} through a channel which outputs uN ∈ {−1, 1}. Both
Bob and Eve output an estimate û of u.
Fig. 2: Theorem 1 states that if f and g are real-valued Boolean functions satisfying some conditions then, from Eve’s point
of view, the computational wiretap can be approximated by an additive wiretap channel. Theorem 2 states that in the case of
Boolean functions the computational wiretap can be approximated by a multiplicative wiretap channel.
Every real-valued Boolean function, f : {−1, 1}n → R can
be represented as a real multilinear polynomial, known as the
Fourier expansion of f .
Theorem 3. Every function f : {−1, 1}n → R can be
uniquely expressed as a multilinear polynomial,
f(x) =
∑
S⊆[n]
f̂(S)xS
where f̂ : 2[n] → R and xS = xi11 . . . x
in
n with ik = 1 if k ∈ S
and ik = 0 otherwise.
Proof. Theorem 1.1 in [3].
Example 1. The majority function on 3 bits, denoted by
Maj3 : {−1, 1}
3 → {−1, 1}, outputs the most frequent ±1 bit
in the input. It is easy to check that its Fourier expansion is
Maj3(x1, x2, x3) =
1
2
(x1 + x2 + x3 − x1x2x3) .
Our main results will rely on the notion of the influence of
a coordinate. This notion was originally introduced in [4] in
the context of social choice theory and has found many other
uses in combinatorics and computer science.
Notation. We will always write random variables in boldface.
Probabilities and expectations will always be with respect to a
uniformly random x ∼ {−1, 1}n unless specified otherwise.
Definition 1. The influence of coordinate i in the function
f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} is defined as
Inf i[f ] = Pr[f(x) 6= f(x
⊕i)]
where x⊕i = (x1, . . . , xi−1,−xi, xi+1, . . . , xn).
Informally, the influence of a coordinate measures how
much it influences the value of the function.
The influence can be expressed in terms of the function’s
Fourier expansion, allowing Definition 1 to be extended to
real-valued Boolean functions.
Theorem 4. Let f : {−1, 1}n → R and i ∈ [n]. Then,
Inf i[f ] =
∑
S∋i
f̂(S)2.
Proof. Theorem 2.20 in [3].
Example 2. Consider the majority function on 3 bits in
Example 1. Then, for every t ∈ [3], Inft[Maj3] = 1/2.
Another key property which can be expressed in terms of
the function’s Fourier expansion is the variance.
Proposition 1. The variance of f : {−1, 1}n → R is
Var[f ] =
∑
S 6=∅
f̂(S)2
Proof. Proposition 1.13 in [3].
Example 3. Consider the majority function on 3 bits in
Example 1. Then, V ar[Maj3] = 1.
The basic invariance principle, Theorem 5, gives conditions
under which the random variable x = (x1, . . . ,xn) can be
substituted by g = (g1, . . . , gn), where each gi is a standard
Gaussian, i.e. a Gaussian with mean 0 and variance 1. We
need the following hypothesis on the probability distributions.
Hypothesis 1. The random variable xi satisfies E[xi] = 0,
E[x2i ] = 1, E[x
3
i ] = 0, and E[x
4
i ] ≤ 9.
The main examples to keep in mind are the uniform ±1
random bit and the standard Gaussian.
We now present the basic invariance principle.
Theorem 5. Let F be a formal n-variate multilinear polyno-
mial of degree at most k ∈ N,
F (x) =
∑
S⊆[n],|S|≤k
Fˆ (S)xS .
Let x = (x1, . . . ,xn) and y = (y1, . . . ,yn) be sequences of
independent random variables, each satisfying Hypothesis 1.
Assume ψ : R→ R is C4 with ||ψ′′′′||∞ ≤ C.
1 Then
|E[ψ(F (x))] − E[ψ(F (y))]| ≤
C
12
9k
n∑
t=1
Inf t[F ]
2.
Proof. See page 357 in [3].
1Being C4 means that the derivatives ψ′, . . . , ψ
′′′′
exist and are continuous.
Some things to note:
• Since the standard Gaussian, gi, satisfies Hypothesis 1,
y can be taken equal to g = (g1, . . . , gn).
• The function ψ is known as a test function. In applica-
tions, the test functions of interest might not be differen-
tiable or bounded by their fourth derivative. However,
these can often be approximated by smooth functions
which do satisfy the necessary conditions. In Corollary
11.68 of [3], for example, the smoothness of ψ is substi-
tuted by a Lipschitz condition.
• The goodness of the approximation depends on the de-
gree, k, of the Fourier expansion of f . This requirement
might be loosened by truncating the polynomial to a
certain degree. This is done in Corollary 11.69 of [3].
In Theorems 1 and 2 we use the following corollary.
Corollary 1. In the setting of Theorem 5, if we furthermore
have V ar[F ] ≤ 1 and Inf t ≤ ǫ for all t ∈ [n], then
|E[ψ(F (x))] − E[F (ψ(y))]| ≤
C
12
k9kǫ.
Proof. Corollary 11.67 in [3].
Example 4. Consider the majority function on 3 bits discussed
in Examples 1, 2, and 3. In the terms of Corollary 1 we have
k = 3 and ǫ = 1/2, so that
|E[ψ(Maj3(x))]− E[Maj3(ψ(g))]| ≤ 92C.
We need three lemmas for Theorems 1 and 2.
The first lemma bounds the variance of the difference of
two real-valued Boolean functions.
Lemma 1. Let f, g : {−1, 1}n → R be two real-valued
Boolean functions. If both V ar[f ] and V ar[g] are smaller
than 1/4, then V ar[f − g] ≤ 1 .
Proof. It follows from the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality that
|Cov[f, g]|
2
≤ V ar[f ]V ar[g] ≤
1
16
.
Thus,
V ar[f − g] = V ar[f ]− V ar[g]− 2Cov[f, g] ≤ 1.
The second lemma shows that if a variable has low influence
on two functions, then it has low influence on their difference.
Lemma 2. Let f, g : {−1, 1}n → R be two real-valued
Boolean functions. If both Inft[f ] and Inft[g] are smaller than
ǫ, then Inft[f − g] ≤ 4ǫ.
Proof.
Inft[f − g] =
∑
S∋t
̂(f − g)(S)2 =
∑
S∋t
(
f̂(S)− ĝ(S)
)2
=
∑
S∋t
fˆ(S)2 +
∑
S∋t
gˆ(S)2 − 2
∑
S∋t
fˆ(S)gˆ(S)
≤ ǫ+ ǫ + 2ǫ
where
∑
S∋t fˆ(S)gˆ(S) ≤ ǫ follows from the Cauchy–Schwarz
inequality.
The third lemma shows that if a variable has low influence
on two functions, then it has low influence on their multiplica-
tion, but depending on the number of terms in the polynomial.
Lemma 3. Let f, g : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} be two Boolean
functions where the polynomials f and g have, respectively,
l1 and l2 terms. If both Inft[f ] and Inft[g] are smaller than
ǫ, then Inft[fg] ≤ 4ǫl, where l = l1l2.
Proof. By definition,
Inft[f.g] =
∑
S∋t
f̂ g(S)2.
We can write f = xtq
f+rf and g = xtq
g+rg where qf , rf , qg
and rg are polynomials which do not depend on xt. Then,
fg = xtq
frg + xtq
grf + qfqg + rf rg .
Since qfqg + rfrg does not depend on xt,
Inft[fg] = Inft[xtq
frg + xtq
grf ].
We will first calculate Inft[xtq
frg ]. Since f and g have,
respectively, l1 and l2 terms, there exists S
f
i , S
g
j ⊆ [n]− {t},
for every i ∈ [l1] and j ∈ [l2], such that
qf =
l1∑
i=1
qfi x
Si and rg =
l2∑
j=1
rgjx
Sj .
Thus,
xtq
frg =
l1∑
i=1
l2∑
j=1
qfi r
g
jx
Si+Sjxt.
Therefore,
Inft[xtq
frg ] =
∑
S∋t
x̂tqfrg(S)
2 ≤
(
l1∑
i=1
l2∑
i=1
qfi r
g
j
)2
≤ l
l1∑
i=1
l2∑
j=1
(
qfi r
g
j
)2
= l
l1∑
i=1
(
qfi
)2 l2∑
j=1
(
rgj
)2
≤ lǫ
where the second inequality follows from the Cauchy–Schwarz
inequality and the last one from the fact that
Inft[f ] =
l1∑
i=1
(
qfi
)2
and
l2∑
j=1
(
rgj
)2
≤ Var[g] ≤ 1.
The same arguments can be used to show that
Inft[xtq
grf ] ≤ lǫ.
Thus, by Lemma 2, Inft[xtq
frg + xtq
grf ] ≤ 4ǫl.
III. GENERAL FUNCTIONS
In this section we show a formal equivalence, from Eve’s
point of view, between the computational wiretap channel, as
in Figure 1a, and the classic wiretap channel, as in Figure 1b.
Let X be a set and f : X → Y and g : X → Z be
two functions. We assume some probability distribution on
X which induces distributions on Y and Z . We denote the
corresponding random variables by x, y, and z.
In the computational wiretap channel, shown in Figure 1a,
Alice has some data x ∈ X and wants to share some
computation h(x) with Bob. To do this, she sends f(x), where
f is some sufficient statistic for h. An eavesdropper, Eve, is
interested in computing another function g(x).
In general, f is not sufficient for computing g, and therefore
Eve will have an estimate
ĝ(x) = argmax
z∈Z
Pr(z = z|y = f(x)).
In the classic wiretap channel, shown in Figure 1b, Alice
sends a message u ∈ U to Bob. A channel outputs noisy
versions, w ∈ W and v ∈ V , of u to Bob and Eve with
probability Pr(w = w,v = v|u = u).
Eve‘s estimate of u is then
û = argmax
u∈U
Pr(channel input u| channel output v).
In Theorem 6 we show that, from Eve’s point of view,
the computational wiretap channel is indistinguishable from
a classic wiretap channel. We need the following definition to
make the statement precise.
Definition 2. Two channels are equivalent, from Eve’s point
of view, if for both channels, the distribution on Eve’s input
and output are the same.
Theorem 6. Every computational wiretap channel is equiva-
lent, from Eve’s point of view, to a classic wiretap channel.
Proof. Consider the computational wiretap channel in Figure
1a. Let u = g(x) and v = f(x) with probability distributions
induced by x. Let these define the variables in Figure 1b,
the random variable w being immaterial (for definiteness set
w = v). Then, in both channels, Eve’s input is f(x) = v and
her output is ĝ(x) = û.
Theorem 6 shows that although there is no noise in the com-
putational wiretap channel, the function f can be interpreted
as a noisy version of g. We now show conditions on f and g
under which g can be retreived exactly from f .
To every input f(x) received by Eve, there corresponds an
estimate ĝ(x). By defining ĝ : Y → Z as ĝ(f(x)) = ĝ(x) we
have the diagram in Figure 3.
The diagram commutes if and only if the estimate is always
correct, i.e. if for every x ∈ X it follows that ĝ(x) = g(x).
This occurs, for example, if f is injective. In this case, f has
a left inverse f−1 and by taking ĝ = g ◦ f−1 it follows that
ĝ(x) = (ĝ ◦f)(x) = (g ◦f−1◦f)(x) = g(x) for every x ∈ X .
X Y
Z
f
ĝ
g
Fig. 3: Diagram for the functions f , g, and ĝ.
The following result completely characterizes the commu-
tativity of the diagram.
Proposition 2. The diagram in Figure 3 commutes if and only
if f(x) = f(x′) implies that g(x) = g(x′).
Proof. Suppose that the diagram commutes. Let x, x′ ∈ X be
such that f(x) = f(x′). Then,
g(x) = (ĝ ◦ f)(x) = (ĝ ◦ f)(x′) = g(x′)
For the converse, suppose that f(x) = f(x′) implies that
g(x) = g(x′) and let y ∈ Y . The fiber of y by f is the
set (f−1(y) = {x ∈ X : f(x) = y}. It follows from our
hypothesis that the image g ◦ f−1(y) has a single element
z ∈ Z . Thus ĝ(y) = z.
Proposition 2 can be restated as follows.
Corollary 2. A computational wiretap channel is equivalent
to a noiseless wiretap channel if and only if, for every x ∈ X ,
f(x) = f(x′) implies that g(x) = g(x′).
IV. REAL-VALUED BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
In this section, we show that when the functions f, g :
{−1, 1}n → R are real-valued Boolean functions with low
influence, the computational wiretap channel, in Figure 1a,
can be approximated, from Eve’s point of view, to an additive
wiretap channel, as in Figure 2a.
We begin by showing a formal equivalence between these
two channels, analogous to Theorem 6.
Theorem 7. Every computational wiretap channel is equiva-
lent, from Eve’s point of view, to an additive wiretap channel.
Proof. Consider the computational wiretap channel in Figure
1a. Let u = g(x) and N(x) = f(x) − g(x) define the
variables in Figure 2a. Then, in both channels, Eve’s input
is f(x) = u(x) +N(x) and her output is ĝ(x) = û.
The noise, N(x), of the additive wiretap channel, in The-
orem 7, depends on the data x and the functions f and g.
In the next theorem, we show that if x is a well behaved
random variable and f and g are low influence functions, i.e.
their values do not depend too much on any coordinate, then
N(x) can be approximated by some noise, N(g), which only
depends on the functions f and g and is independent of x.
Theorem 1. Let x ∼ {−1, 1}n satisfy Hypothesis 1 and g =
(g1, . . . , gn) be such that each gi is a standard Gaussian. Let
f, g : {−1, 1}n → R be of degree k1 and k2 with both Inft[f ]
and Inft[g] smaller than ǫ, for every t ∈ [n], and both Var[f ]
and Var[g] smaller than 1/4. Assume ψ : R → R is C4 with
||ψ′′′′||∞ ≤ C. Then the noise N = f − g satisfies
|E[ψ(N(x))]− E[ψ(N(g))]| ≤
C
3
k9kǫ
where k = k1k2.
Proof. Since Var[f ] and Var[g] are smaller than 1/4, Lemma
1 implies in Var[N ] ≤ 1. Since Inft[f ] and Inft[g] are smaller
than ǫ, Lemma 2 implies in Inft[N ] ≤ 4ǫ. Our result then
follows from Corollary 1.
Example 5. Consider the computational wiretap in Figure 1a
where f, g : {1,−1}n → R are such that
f(x) =
1
n
n−1∑
i=1
xixi+1 and g(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi.
By Theorem 7, this computational wiretap channel is equiv-
alent, from Eve’s point of view, to the additive wiretap channel
in Figure 2a with noise N(x) = f(x)− g(x).
This noise depends not only on f and g but also on x. Using
Theorem 1 we can approximate this noise by N(g) which is
independent of x.
One can check that both Inft[f ] and Inft[g] are smaller
than 2/n2, both V ar[f ] and V ar[g] are smaller than 1/n, and
k = 2. Thus,
|E[ψ(N(x))]− E[ψ(N(g))]| ≤
108C
n2
.
V. BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
In this section, we show that when the functions f, g :
{−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} are Boolean functions with low influ-
ence, the computational wiretap channel, in Figure 1a, can be
approximated, from Eve’s point of view, to a multiplicative
wiretap channel, as in Figure 2b.
We begin by showing a formal equivalence between these
two channels, analogous to Theorems 6 and 7.
Theorem 8. Every computational wiretap channel is equiv-
alent, from Eve’s point of view, to a multiplicative wiretap
channel.
Proof. Consider the computational wiretap channel in Figure
1a. Let u = g(x) and N(x) = f(x)g(x) define the
variables in Figure 2b. Then, in both channels, Eve’s input
is f(x) = u(x)N(x) and her output is ĝ(x) = û.
Remark. The multiplicative wiretap channel in Figure 2a is
equivalent to a binary asymmetric channel with probability
Pr(N = −1|uN = −1) that a 1 is flipped to a −1 and
Pr(N = −1|uN = 1) that a −1 is flipped to a 1.
Analogous to Theorem 7, the noise,N , of the multiplicative
wiretap channel, in Theorem 8, depends on the data x and the
functions f and g. In the next theorem, we show that if x is a
well behaved random variable and f and g are low influence
functions, i.e. their values do not depend too much on any
coordinate, then N(x) can be approximated by some noise,
N(g), which only depends on the functions f and g and is
independent of x.
Theorem 2. Let x ∼ {−1, 1}n satisfy Hypothesis 1 and g =
(g1, . . . , gn) be such that each gi is a standard Gaussian. Let
f, g : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} be of degree k1 with l1 terms and
k2 with l2 terms with both Inft[f ] and Inft[g] smaller than ǫ,
for every t ∈ [n]. Assume ψ : R→ R is C4 with ||ψ′′′′||∞ ≤ C.
Then the noise N = fg satisfies
|E[ψ(N(x))] − E[ψ(N(g))]| ≤
C
3
kl9kǫ
where k = k1k2 and l = l1l2.
Proof. Every Boolean function has Var[N ] ≤ 1. Since Inft[f ]
and Inft[g] are smaller than ǫ, Lemma 3 implies in Inft[N ] ≤
4ǫl. Our result then follows from Corollary 1.
Example 6. Consider the computational wiretap in Fig-
ure 1a where f, g : {1,−1}3 → {1,−1} are such that
f(x) = x1x2x3 and
g(x) =
1
4
(1− x1 − x2 − x3 + x1x2 + x1x3
+ x2x3 + 3x1x2x3).
Then, by Theorem 8, the computational wiretap is equivalent
to the multiplicative wiretap channel in Figure 2b with noise
N(x) = f(x)g(x). This is equivalent to the binary asymmet-
ric channel, in this case a Z-channel, in Figure 4.
1 1
−1 −1
1
1/4
3/4
Fig. 4: Binary asymmetric channel for Example 6.
This noise depends not only on f and g but also on x. Using
Theorem 2, we can approximate this noise by N(g) which is
independent of x.
One can check that both Inft[f ] and Inft[g] are smaller than
1, k = 9 and l = 8. Thus,
|E[ψ(N(x))]− E[ψ(N(g))]| < 105C.
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